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ABSTRACT 
An original survey of Hong Kong establishments identifies hiring and 
employment patterns by age of worker. As in the U.S. I there exi 零七
many firms which employ older workers but do not hire older workers. 
This similarity is important as Hong Kong neither prohibits age 
discrimination nor requires uniform fringe benefit provision. Thus , 
these laws thought to account for the U. S. pattern may not be a 
sufficient explanation. Instead , our finding that those Hong Kong 
firms delaying compensation disproportionately hire younger workers 
suggests that existing hiring patterns may largely be a response to 
inherent monitoring difficulties. 
2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
New1y hired o1der workers remain concentrated in a narrow set of 
industries and occupations as some firms clearly employ older workers 
but do not hire older workers. Instead , these firrns hire 
predominant1y young workers and then re tain them as they age. Th is 
practice has been identified as a factor both increasing the 
unemp10yment duration of older workers and reducing their 1abor force 
participation (Hutchens 1988). Two economic rationales for this 
practice have recent1y received attention. First , Hutchens (1986 , 
1988 , 1993) suggests that back10aded compensation profi1es designed to 
solve the monitoring prob1em reduce the profitabi1ity of hiring o1dèr 
workers. Second , Scott , Berger and Garen (1995) argue that _specific 
1aws prohibiting age discrirnination and requiring uniforrn fringe 
benefits have increased the cost of hiring older workers. In essence , 
these 1aws enforce a back10aded profi1e independent of the rnonitoring 
prob1em. 
The proper emphasis between these two views is crucia1 for po1icy 
making . If reduced hiring opportunities for older workers f10w from 
efficient 10ng term re1ationships designed 仁o increase 1ifetirne effort 
~~J\í 
and productivity , the ca11 for action is rnut色d. However , if specific 
laws dramatically reduce the employment opportunities of older 
workers , those laws should be reviewed and perhaps modified. Thus , a 
core i ssue is the extent to which the unanticipated consequences 
associated wi th federal policy reduce ernployrnent opportunities for 
older worke r s. 
Unfortunate1y , the ability to answer this question is lirnited by 
the absence of counterfac tua1s . First , the evidence presented by 
Hutchens (1986) suggesting the ro1e of deferred cornpensation prior to 
3 
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the new federa1 laws is , as we wi11 argue , not conclusive. 、 Furthe 玄，
the evidence presented by Scott , Berger and Garen (1995) cannot (as 
心 ~'I
they seem t。 realize)easily d l - atangle the role of the federal laws 
from the desire to backload compensation that wou1d have existed 
without the laws . Indeed , no survey conducted after the laws were 
passed would seem to be able to distinguish between the two views. 
Our case study of Hong Kong provides a parallel test which may 
help distinguish which of the two views is appropriate. Unlike the 
U. S. and much of Europe , Hong Kong neither prohibits age 
discrimination nor requires uniform fringe benefit provision. As a 
consequence , it a1lows an exarnination of whether or not indicators öf 
back10aded cornpensation are associated with reduced ernployment 
opportunities for older workers independent of the type of policies 
implemented by the United States. 
Equally , important the data flowing from our estab1ishment based 
survey allows a better examination of the association between 
back10ading and employment opportunities than could the individual 
level data used by Hutchens. As he recognized , "(a)lthough firm level 
data wou1d be ideal for this purpose , the requisite data do not exist 
(Hutchens 1986 , pp. 451)." Our survey identifies a variety of firrn 
level indicators of backloading some of which have not been used 
previously. In addi tion , the firrn level equi valent of the hiring 
"opportunity index" suggested by Hutchens can be created. In short , 
we have tried to generate the type of data earlier examinations 
desired but did not have . 
The heart of this paper isolates the deterrninants of the 
opportunity index. What are the characteristics of those firrns which 
provide fewer hiring opportunities for o1der workers? The evidence 
4 
suggests these firms are , indeed , those that backload the , compensatioq 
package. Thus , backloading appears consistent with a natural response 
to the monitoríng problem whích . has as a byproduct reduced hiring 
prospects for older workers. Wh ile this surely doesn't rule out the 
possibi1ity that government policy makes hiring prospects even worse , 
it may at least take that po1icy off center stage. 
1n what follows , the exp1anations for reduced hiring 
。pportunities for older workers aie presented in Section 2. Section 3 
describes our survey and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 
presents empirical tests designed to examine deferred compensation as 
a determinant o(h~ring opportunities for older workers. Section '-5 
4FUik 
draws several tentat'íve conclusions. 
11. HIRING OPPORTUNITIES FOR OLDER WORKERS 
V J;heory 型 Evidence
{ The economic rationale behind reduced hiring oPP… 
older workers remains debatab1e. Hutchens (1988) reviews some of the 
M山叫a叫ons .J JObS with substantial general training are 
more attractive to younger workers who can capture the returns over 
more years. A1ternatively 1/ j obs with substantial specific training 
叫t 」
en~ail large fixed costs to the firrn (Oi 1962) which are minimized by 
hiring young workers and thus hiring infrequently J / Young w~rkers may 
4L IL77 
have advantages in s trength or may have a more recent 、lintage of 
education. 
ag心stJ
/'、
J 
_/ 
Finally , older workers may simp1y be discriminated 
In addition to these familiar explanations , two competing (but 
not necessarily mutually exclusive) alternatives ernerge. First , 
5 
Hutchens (1986) notes that some emp10yers may so1ve the monitoring 
prob1em by using the de1ayed compensation ~chemes identified by Lazear 
(1979. 1981). These schernes reduce shirK1rtg by back10ading the 
cornpensation profi1e. Workers who exert consistent effort are 
rewarded in their later years with earnings above the value of their 
l 
marginal produçt.- The fear of losing these accumulated quasi rents 
deters shirking , increases productivity and generates 10ngterm 
emp10yrnent re1ationships. The firrn either does not hire o1d workers 
or ~ust offer thern lower wages as they are 1ess we11 motivated by the 
b，ckl~ading scherne. 2 
In , addition , Hutchens argues there exist fixed costs associatE{d 
with backloading the cornpensation profi1e which a1so encou~age 10nger 
term employrnent and the hiring of on1y younger workers. These fixed 
costs arise because the firm must bear some of the burden associated 
with its own incentive to cheat. If workers be1ieve that the firrn may 
renege on the agreement to de1ay compensation , the firm must bear 
costs both in terrns of increased compensation and increased shirking 
(Hutchens 1986 , 443). Thus , the use of de1ayed cornpensation creates 
mtlch the same incenti ve to minimize fixed cos ts as generated by 
specific training. 
仁τhe second recent a1ternative exp1aining reduced hiring 
。pportunities focuses on federal tax and anti discrirnination policies 
(Scott , Berger and Garen 1995). The prohibition on age discrimination 
eliminates the abi1i ty of the firm to adj us t the wages of older 
workers to reflect their additiona1 costs -- primari1y pension costs 
and hea1th insurance costs. Further , tax provisions requiring uniform 
fringe benefits prohibit the adjustrnent of health and pension packages 
of older workers. As a consequence , the employer must pay a11 workers 
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the same "blended wage" which is the value of marginal product minus a 
weighted average of the fringe benefit costs by age. This ímplíes 
that young workers receive compensation (the blended wage plus the low 
cost of their fringe benefits) below theír productivity and older 
workers receive compensation above their productívíty (the blended 
wage plus the high cost of theír frínge benefíts). Thus , the 
governrnent essentia11y d i.ctates a back10aded compensation package 
which rneans that hiring old workers is a money losing proposition for 
the firm. The on1y way the firm can even afford to retain old workers 
is to subsidize them with profits from young workers . Note that all 
workers are assumed equal1y productive and that there is no monitoring 
problem in this model. 
Support for this view fo llows a survey of firms which shows a 
strong negative associatíon between the employer contributíon t。
heal th insurance and the share of hiring accounted for by older 
workers. 3 Yet , it remains possib1e that the pattern of wages and 
health insurance spending would have remained roughly similar despite 
federal polícy. Alternatívely , the compensatíon profíle rnay have 
remained backloaded even if the composition of the profile was changed 
by policy . In this case older workers would still have had 
compensation above their value of marginal product but it wouldn' t 
have come ín f orm of health insurance . The statistical association 
could indicate government policy " c reating" backloading or , instead , 
merely reinforcin g or rearranging backloading that would have taken 
place in any event to solve the monitoring prob1ern. 
Hutchens (1986) presents evidence suggesting the ro1e of 
back10ading in data predating . the federa1 tax and discrimination 
po1icies. He finds that a constructed hir i ng opportunity index 
7 
correlates negatively with indicators of backloaded compensation. The 
index is computed for specific occupation and industry cells. 1t is 
the fraction of all hires who are old divided by the fraction of all 
the employed who are old: 
l(i , j) -
完 of recently hired workers in industry 
i and occupation j that are over ~e k 
宅 of a1l workers in industry i and 
occupation j that are over age k 
The value of this index is then attached to individua1 data from the 
National Longitudina1 Survey using occupation and industry codes. The 
index 1s used as an independent variab1e which - measures the 
opportunity for older workers (Hutchens sets k at age 55) and which 
correlates negatively with workers having a pension , rnandatory 
retirement and with tenure . Each of these is an indicator of de1ayed 
compensation. 
It seems sensible to list a few short comings of the estimations 
used by Hutchens largely in order to motivate our survey. The short 
comings flow from the nature of the avai1ab1e data and seem we1l 
recognized by Hutchens. First J the data is not firm level. The 
opportunity index is generated for specific occupation and industry 
ce11s and is appended to individua1 records. This creates the usual 
error in variables problem but also typically resu1ts in exaggerated 
tests of statistica1 significance. Mou1ton (1986) demonstrates that 
the coefficients on aggregate variab1es (such as the opportunity 
index) used in individual level regressions routinely have standard 
errors that are biased down because of common aggregate error 
8 
components. This seems particu1ar1y 1ike1y because the opportunity 
index was the only aggregate variab1e u~ed by Hutchens. 
Second , . but related to the first , the aggregate nature of the 
index variable means that it cannot easi1y serve as the dependent 
variab1e. The centra1 issue is explaining why certain firrns employ 
but do not hire older workers. Thus , the index would seem to be a 
natural dependent variable. Instead , it is used an independent 
variable in separate equations designed to explain the presence of 
indicators of deferred cornpensation such as pensions , mandatory 
re t ireIBent and tenure -4 Obvious1y , the inabi1ity to use the index as 
a dependent variab1e a1so prohibits sirnu1taneously exarnining the role 
of multiple indicators of delayed compensation. 
Third , the aggregate index variable was based on the 1970 Census 
which need not fit we11 chrono1ogica11y with the individua1 data taken 
from a 1ater wave of the Nationa1 Longi tudinal Survey. The surn of 
these difficulties helps exp1ain the appeal by Hutchens for firm level 
data. 
Our survey perrnits the calcu1ation of establishrnent specific 
values of the opportunity index which can then be explained 
simultaneous1y by a variety of controls inc1uding multip1e indicators 
。 f delayed cornpensation. As a consequence , it avoids rnany of problerns 
inherent in the data of Hutchens and it does so in an environment 
without the federal policies emphasized by Scott , Berger and Garen. 
Th豆豆鎧豆豆主旦旦旦旦旦旦主
Examining the relationship between hiring opportunity and delayed 
cornpensation might not naturally take one to Hong Kong but we argue 
that it provides an interesting case study. First , the economy is 
9 
well developed with a high standard of living and many of the same 
issues of indus trial composi tion as other maj or ~conomies. Suen 
(1995) details the increasing movement away from manufacturing and 
toward services and trade . Despite this , Hong Kong retains a 
reasonably we11 diversified economy. 1n addition , the economy shares 
many 1egal conventions and institutions with western economies 
inc1uding the ability to form unions (although they are very weak). 
Second , there are relatively fewer governmenta1 policies 
regulating the labor market. As emphasized , there is no prohibition 
on age discrimination or requirement for benefi t uniformi ty . Thus , 
firms are allowed to set mandatory retirement agesor maximum hiring 
ages. Un1ike many western European countries there exists no gene-ral 
governmental provision of health 5 ~nsurance. τhis combination 
suggests a strong analog to the U.S. prior to the recent changes in 
federal po1icy. Obviously , we are not arguing that the economies are 
the same on1y that the comparison could be enlightening. 
Further , despite the absence of governmental policies , the labor 
market in Hong Kong cannot be described as a 11 spot market. If τhe 
average tenure for ma1es is near1y seven years (see A Fact Finding 
Study 1996) and while pensions are not ubiquitous , neither are they 
rare. Thus , we take evidence of compensation back10ading to be a rnore 
nearly "natural" response in Hong Kong and we are interested in 
whether or not it positive1y correlates with reduced hiring 
opportunities for o1der workers. 
111. THE SURVEY AND THE VARIABLES 
In February of 1996 our survey was rnai1ed to a random samp1e of 
estab1ishments in Hong Kong.τhe data bank of estab1ishment names and 
10 
addresses is maintained by the Census and Statistics Department and 
was made avai1ab1e to us. The mailing had the advantage of a cover 
1etter from the Manpower and Education Branch of the Hong Kong 
government encouraging a11 estab1ishments to respond and by the end of 
March a total of 770 responses had been returned for a gross response 
6 
rate of about 31 percent. See "A Fact Finding Study" (1996) for more 
detai1 on the questionnaire and the survey methodo1ogy. 
The survey elicited information used to create the estab1ishment 
1eve1 opportuni ty index. Each estab1ishment identified its tota1 
nwnber of recent hires and its tota1 nwnber of workers. These were 
broken down into those hires and workers above age 35 and those hires 
and workers age 35 or be1ow. Thus the opportunity index , Index , is 
the share of a11 recent estab1ishment hires comprised of older 
workers , phíre , divided by the share of a11 employees comprised of 
older workers , pemp. Wh ile this cut point differs substantia11y from 
the 55 year old division used by Hutchens , it a1lows the same 
fundamenta1 cornparisons to be rnade. Those firms ernp10ying older 
workers but not hiring them should be observed hiring a 
disproportionate share of workers below age 35. Put sornewhat 
different1y , the division at age 35 certainly a110ws an exarnination of 
the re1at i ve hiring opportunities of younger workers , a very c1ose1y 
re1ated issue. 
Tab1e 1 p resents the frequency distribution of the Opportunity 
Index. While we wi11 discuss the se1ected samp1e in rnore detail , the 
distribution rnakes clear that there are profound differences in the 
va1ue of the index. If a firrn hired in proportion to i ts exis ting 
distribution of workers , the value of the index would be one . Near1y 
a fifth of the establishments report the share of hires comprised by 
11 
older workers is less than one - quarter the share of total workers 
comprised by older workers. Indeed , we find that fifty-two firms in 
the 1owest ' category made absolutely no hires of older workers despite 
making some hires , a requirement to be retained in our se1ected 
sample. These are tru1y firms that "emp1oy older workers but do not 
hire older workers." 
Interestingly , there exist firms that appear to favor older 
workers . More than a quarter of a11 estab1ishments (the 1ast two 
categories) have a share of older recent hires greater than their 
share of older workers. Obvious1y , these firms have increased their 
percentage of older workers as a resu1 t of recent hiring. In tota1 , 
the dispersion in the measure suggests that investigating the 
determinants of the opportunity index is a va1uab1e inquiry. 
A series of unique survey question identify the presence of 
de1ayed compensation. The essence of de1ayed compensation is that the 
earnings profi1e over a worker' s tenure is steeper than otherwise 
imp1ied. Only with this steeper profile can early earnings bui1d up 
quasi-rents that are paid back 1ater. τhe manifestation of this 
profi1e is the preva1ence of 10ng term workers (Lazear 1979). The 
survey identifies the proportion of each estab1ishmen亡， s workforce 
that has tenure greater than five years. 
We recognize that both a steeper profi1e and greater tenure may 
a1so be indicati ve of interna1 1abor markets in which workers are 
promoted wi thin the firm over their tenure. Yet , this realization 
need not change the logic for reduced hiring of older workers. The 
possibi1ity of interna1 promotion motivates on1y those workers 
anticipating a 10ng tenure (Siebert and Addison 1991). Thus , the 
12 
i.nternal labor market itself can be .viewed as a type of delayed 
compens a.tion that would encourage .the hiring of younger workers . 
1~ ~抗
工n addi tion to measuring tenure , the survey contains four other 
indicators of delayed compensation. First , we know whether the 
establishment offers its workers a pension plan. This obviously 
7 
shifts earnings to the end of the worker's profile.' Second , we have 
the manager's perception of whether or not a job applicant's expected 
length of service is an important component in making a good hiring 
dec.ision. Wh ile an indirect measure of delayed compensation , it 
should serve as a crucial control. Where expected length of 
employment is important , one would anticipate backloaded compensation 
- as a technique to encourage longer tenure. Third , we know whether or 
not establishments have had recent layoffs. This tends to indicate an 
establishment in which long term employment relations are less 
prevalent and in which delayed compensation is consequently 1ess 
likely.8 Fourth , we know whether or not the firm uses a formal and 
regular appraisal system for all workers. Using a worker appraisal 
system seems a necessary component of successful backloading. Only 
when a firm can evaluate workers will backloading serve to deter 
shirking. If shirking cannot be detected , backloading accomplishes 
nothing. We take the presence of an appraisal system as evidence of 
worker evaluation and as a weak indicator of backloaded compensation. 9 
The desc riptive statistics for the five indicators of delayed 
cornpensation are presented at the top of Table 2. The use of so many 
overlapping indicators represents a unique aspect of our empirica1 
investigation. Wh ile it raises the specter of collinearity , it 
provides a rich opportunity for examining the role of deferred 
10 
compensatíon. 
13 
τhe survey provides a series of logical controls which might be 
expected to influence the age of hires. Managers are asked t。
identify the role of technical change at their establishrnent. When 
such change exists , the hiring of younger workers could be anticipated 
as they may have a more recent vintage of education and ski~l. The 
presence of a union may influence hiring behaviorbut notice in the 
second part of Table 2 that only a small share of establishments have 
unionized workers. The size of the establishment (number of workers) 
may influence hiring. Larger firms may have more developed internal 
labor markets that make hiring young workers more likely. 
Alternatively , larger firms may be able to better spread the costs of 
establishing alternative motivational schemes such as incentive or 
merit pay. If so , larger firms might be less 1ikely to have deferred 
compensation. 
Each establishment indicates the broad occupation of the largest 
share of its workers: unskilled manual , skilled manual , sales or 
professional. These are used to generate three du血血y variables with 
unskilled manual (blue collar) as the base. The notion that the age 
of hiring may vary by occupation seems sensible as more skilled 
occupations entail greater general and specific training. As 
emphasized earlier , the presence of either type of training generates 
the hiring of younger workers. Moreover , the vintage of training and 
education may be particularly crucial for those in more skilled 
occupations. Thus , we anticipate that the more skilled occupations 
will correlate negatively with the opportunity index. 
Additional controls include a measure of the product market power 
of the firrn and a series of seven industrial dununies. The latter 
capture broad based differences in technology and the former is 
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predicated on the frequently made contention that hiring 
discrirnination is rnore 1ikely when a firm has rnarket power (Becker 
1957) . Thus , firms with rnarket power might be expected to provide 
less opportunity for older workers. A1ternative1y , firms with market 
power may not cost minimize and thus , may forgo 1abor saving incentive 
schemes inc1uding delayed cornpensation. McKersie , Miller and 
Quarterrnan (1964) suggested this argurnent rnore than three decades ago 
and it has received sporadic support (see Drago and Heywood 1995). If 
correct , one might anticipate 1ess de1ayed compensation and greater 
11 hiring opportunities for older workers for firrns with market power. 
In any event , rnarket structure is included as a control. 
The final selected samp1e uses all of the responses that had 
cornplete inforrnation for a11 questions. We inc1ude only those 
establishments older than five years so that the crucial tenure 
variable was meaningful. We include only private sector for profit 
establishrnents and , finally , we only include those establishrnents that 
had done some hiring within the last three years so as to not generate 
12 
misleading opportunity indices for these estab1ishments.~- The 
combination of these restrictions results in the final selected sample 
369 observations. 
IV. DETERMINANTS OF HIRING OPPORTUNITY 
The dependent variable , the opportunity index , may take any 
nonnegative value. As an initial estimation , the index is regressed 
agaínst the independent varíables. Tab1e 3 presents the estirnated 
determinants of the opportunity index. Concentrating on the 
indicators of delayed compensation , four of the five negative 
coefficients were anticipated (on1y the negative sign on dismiss is 
15 
unanticipated). Coefficients for two . of coefficients are 
statistically significant , tenure and pension , while one just misses 
significance , appraisal. Thus , the presence of delayed compensation 
does correlate with reduced hiring opportunity for older workers. 
1n addition , the broad occupational dummies perform as expected 
with their being reduced opportunity associated with more skilled 
occupations. The pattern of the coefficients reveals that , holding 
all else equal , unskilled rnanual workers have the greatest opportunity 
followed by skilled workers , sales workers and finally professionals. 
Of the remaining controls only two of the industry dumrnies achieved 
significance. As is often the case in cross-sectional data , a large 
portion of the variance remains unexplained. 
The pattern of occupational results has an alternative 
interpretation in keeping with the role of delayed compensation. 1t 
makes sense that the output of those in rnore skilled occupations may 
be less readily observable and j udgrnent about the quali ty of that 
output open to more uncertainty. This could reduce the ease and 
effectiveness of alternative motivation schemes such as piece rates or 
merit pay schemes and might suggest that backloading wou1d be rnore 
likely for more skilled occupations. 1n this light , the pattern of 
occupational results could be seen as additional confirmation for the 
ro1e of backloading in reducing the hiring opportuni ties of older 
workers. 
Note that the constructed index which we borrowed from Hutchens 
generates a restricted form of a more general estimation. The 
employment share serves as a denominator and so the independent 
variab l es are presurned to influence the hiring share in such a way 
that the index itself is a linear function of the controls . Yet , this 
16 
< restricts thé re1ationship between the hiring share and the emp10yment 
share. To see thïs take a specific examp1e. Imagine that whenever 
the emp10yment share changes , the hiring share rnatches that change. 
Thus , hiring merely replicates the current ernployment pattern by age. 
If the ernp10yment share was a separate regressor using the hiring 
share as the dependent variables , this rep1ication hypothesis wou1d be 
s û.pported by a coefficient equal to one on the ernployment share. 
Obviously , the coefficient might take any value and the point is that 
the relationship is lost by using the constructed index as the only 
dependent variab1e. 
Moreover , the view of Scott , Berger and Black is that older 
workers represent net losses to the firm that rnust be made up by the 
net gains represented by younger workers. When old workers èomprise a 
large share of the firrn's employrnent , the blended wage is much closer 
to the cost of the older worker and the size of the 10ss on each older 
workers is smaller. τhus ， they argue that when firms have large 
shares of older workers , the reduction in profits from hiring an older 
workers is smaller and the firrn will be more likely to do so (pp. 784 
- 785). This amounts to the prediction that the share of old workers 
positively influences the share of old hires. This contention cannot 
be examined using the full index as a dependent variable. 
The second colurnn of Table 3 estimates a variant on the 
determinants of hiring opportunities for older workers. The dependent 
variable is the share of a11 hires who are old , phire I and the 
independent variables are augmented by the share of all workers who 
are old , pernp. From a purely descriptive point of view this appears a 
stronger estimation. Over forty percent of the variation in the 
dependent variable is explained. Moreover , the new variab1e is 
17 
extremely important. The coefficient takes a value of about .6 and 1s 
13 
very high1y significant. LJ Wh i1e this may support the notion of a 
blended wage , the hypothesis that value of coefficient is one can be 
easi1y rejected. Thus , the recent hiring does not serve to rep1icate 
the existing distribution as on1y about sixty percent of the current 
share of old workers is ref1ected in the share of new hires. 
Of particular interest for our investigation are the indicators 
of de1ayed compensation. Again , four of the five coefficients retain 
the expected negative signs but now a1l four reach statistical 
sígnificance at the five percent 1eve1. e r a s e 
d u t sL n σo a m e h mi 
substantial. To present the magnitudes first assume that all 
significant indicators are absent. This we take to be that the values 
of pension , serlength and appraisal are zero and the va1ue of the 
tenure variable is one standard deviation below its mean. Using these 
assumptions and setting all other variab1es to their rnean 1evels , the 
equation in the second column al10ws us to predict the share of hires 
who will be old. Th is prediction is the first entry in the second 
column of tab1e 4. Note that simp1y increasing the tenure variab1e 
from one standard deviation below its rnean to one standard deviation 
above its mean reduces the share of hiring which is old by eight 
percentage points , the second entry in that co1urnn. More drarnatic is 
the decline associated with changing all the significant indicator 
variables from zero to one. This results in about a twenty percentage 
point decline.τhe cornbination of these two declines are responsib1e 
for turning a firrn that would otherwise rnake roughly ha1f of its hires 
older workers to one that hires only about one old worker out of six! 
The first co1umn of Table 4 is the analog for the original regression 
using the opportunity index and repeats the pattern . 
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τhe remainder of the regression in Column 2 . of Table 3 repeats 
the result that the more ski11ed occupations have reduced 
opportunities for the hiring of older workers. In addition , the size 
variable ernerges with a significant and positive coefficient. The 
hiring opportunities for older workers appear to be better in larger 
firms but the rnagni tude is not overwhe1ming. An increase of 500 
workers increases the share of older hires only about 2.3 percentage 
points. Nonetheless , this supports the view that alternative 
motivational schemes are more 1ike1y in larger fírms that can spread 
14 fixed costs over greater numbers.τhe other control variables are 
insignifícantly dífferent frorn zero revea1íng no role for technicál 
change , unions or rnarket struξture. The conflícting theoretical 
predictíons for some of these varíables , for instance market 
structure , rnay help explain their írrelevance. 
The nature of the dependent varíables in the regressíons gíves 
some reason for pause. They are each truncated frorn below at zero. 
Indeed , the share of híres that are older workers is truncated above 
at one as well but this is not a particu1arly important point as no 
va1ues in the samp1e equal to one. However , 52 observations have a 
value of zero for each of the dependent varíab1es as these firms made 
no hires of older workers despite making some hires.τhis raises the 
possibílíty that sorne of the ínfluence ídentífied for de1ayed 
compensatíon is not rnerely on the share of hires that are old but on 
the dichotomous varíable of whether or not to have any old hires at 
all. 
Our investígation easí1y shows that thís concern is unwarranted. 
In τable 5 we reestírnate the regressíons from Table 3 e xcludíng the 
fífty observatíons that took the value of zero. As ís evídent , 
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virtually every relatiónship is replicated. 1n particu1ar a11 five 
indicators of delayed compensation retain their negative coefficients 
and in the second estimation four of the five are again highly 
significant. The other contro1s a1so show very similar patte 'rns. 
Thus , the zero va1ues are not determinative of the relationship we've 
identified. A1so note that tobit estimation of the two equations adds 
to the unanimity with a11 significant coefficients in Tab1e 3 again 
emerging as statistical1y significant. These results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
Fina11y we undertook a co11aborative investigation to see if the 
attitudes of managers ref1ected the ro1e of de1ayed compensation we 
have uncovered. The survey asks managers from each of the 
estab1ishments to describe the age they prefer when making hiring 
decisions. The managers cou1d identify a preference for workers 35 
and be10w (50.4 percent of the sample) , a preference for workers above 
age 35 (16 . 8 percent of the samp1e) , or no preference (32.8 percent of 
the samp1e). We replicate the specification from the second co1umn of 
Table 3 using these responses as a dependent variab1e. 1n column one 
of τab1e 6 we create a dwruny dependent variab1e which equa1s one if 
the estab1ishment/s manager prefers young workers and zero otherwise , 
PreferYoung.τhe estimation fits a cumu1ative norma1 , the probit 
equation. Note that virtua11y a11 of the coefficient signs reversed. 
Th is fo11ows expectations as those variab1es associated with reduced 
hiring opportunity for older workers shou1d be positive1y associated 
wi t h a preference for hiring younger workers. Four of the five 
indicators of de1ayed compensation take a positive sign with a11 four 
having t-statistics greater than one but on1y the pension indicator 
achieving significance at the five percent level. Also statistical1y 
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significant and taking the expected signs are the size variable , the 
older worker sháre of employment and one of the occupation dummies. 
Our" second probit estimation alters the dependent variable by 
making the dummy equal one if the es tablishment I s manager prefers 
younger workers and equal zero if the manager prefers older workers , 
AvoidOld. Those who express no preference are removed from the 
estimation. The second colurnn presents these results and again 
confirms that all statistically significant results collaborate the 
results using actual hiring patterns . 工n addition to largely 
replicating the results from column one , the other two occupational 
dummies becorne statistically s ignificant and a second indicator óf 
delayed compensation , SerLength , reaches - statistical significance. 
There are no statistically signífícant results at odds with the 
results on the actual hiríng practíces. That is , every significant 
determínant of preferring younger híres is also a significant 
determínant of reduced hiring opportuníty for older workers. 
The magnítudes involved are substantíal . The second probit 
equation can be used to project p r obabilíties holdíng all other 
variables at their mean levels. If we assume the two sígnificant 
índicators of delayed compensation are absent , the likelihood of a 
manager preferríng young workers is . 538. If we assurne the two 
indicators are p r esent , the likelíhood jurnps to . 973 . Thus , the 
attitudes of the managers largely reflect the more objectíve evidence 
of the establishment ' s híring behavíor. 
V. Conclusions 
τhe object of thís research was to investigate t h e association 
between indicators of delayed compensation and hiríng oppo r tuni ties 
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for older workers. The economy of Hong Kong was chosen to provide a 
case study in which a developed economy does not have a prohibition on 
age discrimination , does not have tax requirernents for uniforrn fringe 
benefits and does not have governmental provísion of health insurance. 
The absence of these features allows an exarnínation largely 
independent of governmental íntervention. 
An oríginal survey of establíshments was undertaken ín order to 
generate the type of data rnost suítable for the ínvestigatíon. In 
addítion to ínformatíon on the age dístributíon of employment and 
hiring , ínformatíon was collected on indícators of delayed 
compensatíon. Wh ile these indicators may be írnperfect and 
overlapping , the evidence remaíns persuasíve. Delayed compensation is 
híghly correlated wíth reduced híring opportunítíes for older workers. 
When the share of long tenure workers ís hígh , when pensions are 
present , when expected length of service is irnportant in hiring and 
when appraisal systerns are ín place , hiríng ís dísproportionately 
among younger workers. Thus , delayed cornpensatíon , adopted for 
reasons other than governmental intervention , creates íts own pressure 
to hire younger workers. This resul t persists through a varíety of 
subsamples and specifications. Wh ile this finding does not elimínate 
the potential influence of governmental intervention , it highlights 
that such intervention rnay not be the prírnary reason for delayed 
compensation and so not the primary reason for reduced híring 
opportunities for older workers. It suggests further that the reduced 
hiring opportunities for older workers associated with delayed 
compensation may be a natural response to the rnonitoríng problem and 
so may mute the call for changes in public policy. 
The evidence of reduced hiring opportunities for older workers 
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1 司戶 11(.刁 ~I呵 ð1~
was collaborated by an examination of managerial attitudes. In those 
circwnstances in which hiring opportunities for older workers were 
reduced , managers were more likely to express a preference for hiring 
younger workers. This type of collaborative evidence is hard to 
replicate in other econornies in which the government prohibi ts age 
discrimination. It seems unlikely that over fifty percent of managers 
in such countries would admit to a preference which if followed would 
violate the law. This difference further highlights the value of our 
comparative study. 
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TABLE 1 
FREQUENCY D工 STR工BUT工ON OF THE HIRING OPPORTUNITY INDEX 
Value of Frequency Percentage 
the lndex 
o - 0.25 68 18.4、
0.26 - 0.50 62 16.8 
0.51 - 0.75 72 19.5 
0.76 - 1.00 62 16.8 
1.01 - 1.25 40 10.9 
greater than 1.26 65 17.6 
Note: Th is 1s distribution of the opportunity index , Index , which 1s 
the ratio of the share of recent hires comprised of older workers to 
the share of a11 employees cornprised of o1der workers. 
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TABLE TI10 
Definitions , Meansand Standard Deviations 
Indicators of Deferred Compensation 
Tenure Percentage of the estab1ishment' s workforce with more than 
five years of tenure with the firm (32.9 , 22.2) 
Pension Dununy團1 if the estab1ishment offers its emp10yees some form 
of pension (.612 , .488) 
SerLength Dununy=1 if the manager identifies that the anticipated 
1ength of service is an important hiring criteria (.222 , .416) 
Dismiss Dununy-1 if the estab1ishment has had layoffs in the workforce 
during the last 24 months (.325 , .469) 
Appraise Dummy-1 if the cornpany conducts a regular appraisa1 of a11 
staff ( . 67 2 , .470) 
Other Controls 
Skilled Durnmy自1 if ski11ed manual (blue co11ar) workers represent the 
largest group of workers in the firm (.444 , .498) 
Sales Dununy團1 if sa1es workers represent the 1argest group of workers 
in the firm (.201 , .401) 
Profess Dummy=1 if professiona1 workers represent the largest group 
。 f workers in the firm ( . 173 , .379) 
TechChng Du血my=1 if new machinery or equiprnent has been introduced in 
the last three years (exc1uding routine rep1acement) (.298 , .458) 
Union Dununy=l if the estab1ishment recognizes a union (.035 , .185) 
Size The number of workers in the establishment (315.1 , 689.5) 
MPower Durnmy圍1 if the establishment reports that there are only a 
"few" c ompetitors in its product 1ine ( . 252 , .535) 
Hiring and Employment 
Pemp The percentage of the estab1ishrnen亡 's workforce above the above 
the age of 35 ( 36.4 , 22.1) 
Phire The percentage of the establishrnent' s recent hires (three 
years) that were above the age of 35 (29.7 , 27.9) 
工ndex The value for each estab1ishrnent of Phire divided by Pernp 
(.967 , 1.51) 
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TABLE τHREE 
R~gression Analysis 
Dependent Var. lridex Phire 
Constant 1.097** 36.09** 
(7.098) (6.540) 
Tenure -.0068* ';.1769** 
(1.852) (3.129) 
Pension -.4951** -8.166可甜食
(2.801) (3.039) 
SerLength -.1280 
-5.875** 
(0.688) (2.079) 
Dismiss 
-.0818 -2.585 
(0.485) (1.009) 
Appraise 
-.2997 -5.880女女
(1.629) (2.094) 
Ski11ed 
- .7387** -13 . 44** 
(3.410) (4 . 050) 
Sa1es 
-.9159** -15.11** 
(3.355) (3.612) 
Profess 
- . 9604** 
-14.19** 
(3.521) (3.612) 
TechChng .0896 .6456 
(0.515) (0.243) 
Union 
- . 1779 .9291 
(0.405) (0.139) 
Size .0002 
.0047** 
(1.306) (2.425) 
MPower .0985 
-1.828 
(0 . 547) (0.665) 
Pemp .6046女女
(10.53) 
Industry YES YES 
Dwnmies 
R-Squared .1362 
.4189 
Samp1e Size 369 369 
*significant at the 10 percent 1evel 
可即可~significant at the 5 percent 1evel 
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Table 4 
Magnitude of the Influence of Delayed Compensation 
Predicted Index Predicted Phire 
1. Indicators 1.677 44.70 
Absent 
2. Tenure one s.d. 1.071 36.85 
above its mean 
3. A11 significant 0.750 24.78 
du血血y indicators 
equa1 1 
4. A11 significant 0.576 16.93 
indicators (2 & 3) 
Note that a11 predictions assume the regressors other than the five 
indicators of de1ayed compensation are at their mean va1ues. A1so 
note that in row three the number of additiona1 significant indicators 
is one in column one and three in column two. 
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τABLE FIVE 
Additiona1 Regression Ana1ysis 
Dependent Var. Index 
Constant 2.385** 
(6.952) 
Tenure -.0059 
(1.396) 
Pension -.5718** 
(2.825) 
SerLength -.1402 
(0.680) 
Dismiss -.1021 
(0.540) 
Appraise -.3744* 
(1.793) 
Ski11ed -.7645** 
(3.200) 
Sa1es -.8893*決
(2.825) 
Profess -1.059** 
(3.522) 
TechChng .0951 
(0.486) 
Union -.2749 
(0.598) 
Size .0001 
(0.680) 
MPower .2003 
(0.983) 
Pemp 
Industry YES 
Dummies 
R-Squared .1552 
Samp1e Size 317 
*significant at the 10 percent 1eve1 
**significant at the 5 percent 1eve1 
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Phire 
40.19** 
(7.350) 
-.1291** 
(2.292) 
-8.722** 
(3.276) 
-6.057** 
(2.237) 
-1.758 
(0.707) 
-7.751** 
(2.802) 
-14.21、每決
(4.488) 
-13.46*女
(3.256) 
-15.34** 
(3.853) 
.2116 
(0.082) 
-2.162 
(0.358) 
.0028* 
(1.659) 
-.5717 
(0.212) 
.6275** 
(11.15) 
YES 
.5110 
317 
S .、LS 
XY T414 sa 
n 
EA L Bt Ai Tb 
o r PA 
Dependent Var. PreferYoung Avoid01d 
Constant .5551 
(1.617) 
.9388* 
(1.951) 
Tenure .0048 
(1.355) 
- .0013 
(0.257) 
Pension .3351** 
(2.023) 
.7603** 
(3.070) 
SerLength .2135 
(1.231) 
.5236* 
(1.802) 
Dismiss -.1141 
(0.729) 
-.0347 
(0.147) 
Appraise .1876 
(1.073) 
.0856 
(0.345) 
Skilled .2877 
(1.394) 
1.002** 
(3.645) 
Sa1es .5076* 
(1.935) 
.7673** 
(2.051) 
Profess .1356 
(0.525) 
.9548** 
(2.510) 
TechChng -.1606 
(0.992) 
.2185 
(0.789) 
Uni。τ.1088
(0.280) 
.8780 
(1.247) 
Size -.0003** 
(2.379) 
-.0004會
(1.692) 
MPower -.3881** 
(2.310) 
-.3816 
(1.368) 
Pemp -.0192** 
(5.008) 
.0282** 
(5.605) 
Industry YES 
Durn血ies
YES 
Chi-squared 74.09 
Liklihood Ratio Index .145 
Sample Size 369 
92.88 
.333 
248 
*significant at the 10 percent leve1 
**significant at the 5 percent 1eve1 
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Endnotes 
lThes~ additiona1 earnings are paid from "savings" in the ear1y ' ye~rs 
when workers earn 1ess than their va1ue of margina1 product. 
2Note that the backloaded compensation scheme may alsobe success ful 
in attracting the more ambitious and se1f-motivated who have a 10nger 
time horizon and career perspective. 
3Indeed , the actual testing framework shares some characteristics with 
the "opportunity index" developed by Hutchens (1986) as the share of 
a11 workers accounted for by older workers is used as an independent 
contro1 in a regression exp1aining the share of a11 hires accounted 
for by older hires. 
4The exception is Hutchens (1993) in which the index 1s taken as a 
dependent variable designed to measure job duration. The index (still 
measured at the industry by occupation 1evel) is regressed against 
on1y the age of individual new hires. There is no attempt to assess 
the role of delayed compensation in this estimation. 
5Those admitted to a governrnent hospital are heavily subsidized and 
the employer does not contribute to this subsidy. 
60fficia1s of the Census and Statistics Department suggested to us 
that the characteristics of the respondents a1igned well with the full 
population. 
7τhis is especial1y so given that pensions in Hong Kong typically 
require substantia1 tenure before vesting. 
32 
8Using 1ayoffs as an indicator of where delayed compensation is absent 
has been common (see Drago and Heywood 1995). In short , workers are 
unlikely to accept delayed compensation of there is a high chance that 
a 1ayoff could separate them their accumulated quasi-rents. 
9We note that some appraisal systems may be used to reward workers 
direct1y for high performance and , as such , may represent an 
a1ternative motivational scheme to backloading. However , those in 
human resource management often see appraisals as an opportuni ty to 
reaffirm the commi tment to prepare workers for a long career. Th is 
would seem consistent with both internal labor markets and back10aded 
compensation. 
10 Indeed , our questionnaire asked for estimates of the slope of the 
wage profile by identifying the average earnings work current workers 
with 5 and 10 years of tenure. This variable was never significant in 
the regressions and missing data forced an unacceptable dec1ine in 
sample size. 
11 Note that it is possible that superior cost containment might be the 
very reason for a firm ' s successful market position. If this is the 
case , market power might be associated wi th greater use of delayed 
compensation. 
12 If the establishment did no hiring , the share of hiring above age 35 
would obvious1y be undefined. 
13 It is interesting to note that the value Scott , Berger and Black 
found for this coefficient was also close to . 6 despite the 
alternative cut point in the age distribution of age 55 . 
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14 Indeed , size has often corre1ates positive1y . with a1ternative 
incentive schemes such a piece rates and merit pay (seeBrown 1990). 
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